epistemic justice is a form of injustice related to knowledge.
Originally coined by Miranda Fricker, epistemic injustice is the act of a person being unfairly treated in their capacity to know something, or their ability to describe their experience of the world.
Epistemic injustice involves
- exclusion and silencing
- systematic distortion or misrepresentation of one’s meanings or contributions
- undervaluing of one’s status or standing in communicative practices; unfair distinctions in authority
- unwarranted distrust.
epistemic justice can manifest in several ways, including:
- Testimonial Injustice: When a person’s credibility is unjustly discounted due to prejudices about their identity (e.g., racial or gender biases).
- Hermeneutical Injustice (hermeneutical = interpretation): When a person’s experience lacks the necessary social or conceptual resources to be understood by society, leaving them “epistemically marginalized.” This can occur when there is no recognized language or framework to express certain experiences, making it difficult for others to understand or empathize.
- indigenous medicine, mental health
- Silencing: The act of dismissing, ignoring, or preventing individuals from speaking up or sharing knowledge. Silencing can happen when people self-censor because they anticipate disbelief or dismissal, or when social structures explicitly exclude certain voices.
Dominant societal power structures deem some forms of knowledge more important, and some voices more audible — which makes some stories and experiences more easily believed than others. Linked to Foucault (1977): power produces knowledge, and knowledge justifies power, while power is a hidden force.
- knowledge is produced by “trusted” authority figures and institutions such as schools, governments, hospitals, etc for certain purposes
- society validates this information and gives the forces that produce this information more power ()